In the past year, we have seen numerous publicly traded corporations (Marriott and T-Mobile), airlines (Cathay Pacific and Delta), and tech companies (Facebook and Google+) all breached because of some type of insider threat or compromised credentials. So, it’s no surprise that insider threats and preventing credential compromise are growing concerns for organizations.
It has been more than a year since I last shared Preempt Inspector statistics. Last time we shared Preempt Inspector statistics we found some alarming numbers. With the end of 2018 approaching, I would like to share with you key findings from Preempt Inspector [a free security tool that has been replaced by the more robust and also free Preempt Lite] to help you focus on the most important security issues you might be facing.
Over the past few years, we’ve observed significant changes in the types of conversations we’re having with CISOs. What used to be discussions about how to keep bad guys out has evolved to how to manage and address internal threats. Internal threats come in a variety of shapes and sizes. It could be an attacker who has already gotten in and waiting for the right moment to make a move. It could also be an insider threat. It could be a malicious insider looking to do harm to the organization. Or it could be employees who don’t mean any harm but may doing things (knowingly or unknowingly) that could put an organization at risk.
With the perimeter all but dissolved, and as enterprises transition to the cloud, it’s becoming clear that identity, and where there are points of access, is the new perimeter. The challenge for many organizations is how to understand their posture around identity. This requires understanding who is doing what, when, and where, and understanding it across all applications and platforms on prem, in the cloud and in hybrid environments. Having a holistic view of identity--all users, privileges, access patterns and accounts--is becoming more critical in order to be more proactive and to have proper controls over accounts (privileged, user, service, and more) and to being able to protect accounts from compromise.
It's easy to think that attackers have gained an unfair advantage over security professionals. The network perimeter has virtually dissolved, compelling enterprises to simultaneously work to keep the bad guys out while tackling multiple insider threats – naïve employees, malicious insiders, careless third parties, and undetected malware or intruders that have already breached network defenses.
The challenge for security teams today? Legitimate users and activities should not be impeded, but determining what activity to block and what to allow is not always easy.
In part 1 of the post on how Insider Threat Awareness is a vital component of Security Awareness, I talked about the different types of insider threats and some of the steps that security teams can do to protect themselves and educate employees.
This week I want to explore whether that is enough and some tips for how to approach introducing Insider Threat Awareness training in your organization.
To recap, at a high level here are some of the things security organizations can do:
- Use User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) to monitor behavior and actions
- Control user access and use two-factor authentication
- Have fewer privileged users
- Create a security culture of awareness
- Know your users and watch for behavioral changes
- Perform background checks on all users
- Educate employees about security
- Address cyber security in SLAs
Is this enough?
In a white paper (well worth reading in its entirety) about insider threats in nuclear security systems, the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (AMACAD) noted that there are deep organizational and cognitive biases that lead managers to downplay the threats insiders pose to their nuclear facilities and operations. Could insider threats be the elephant in the security room? Some of AMACAD’s findings are broadly applicable to many organizations and several may prompt you to re-evaluate your insider threat strategy:
- Organizations that consider their staff to be part of a carefully screened elite can lead management to falsely assume that insider threats may exist in other institutions, but not in their organization.
- The belief that personnel who have been through a background check will not pose an insider problem is remarkably widespread—a special case of the “not in my organization” fallacy. There are two reasons why this belief is mistaken. First, background checks are often not very effective. Second, even completely trustworthy employees may become insiders, especially if they are coerced.
- High-security facilities typically have programs to monitor the behavior of employees for changes that might suggest a security issue. Security managers often assume that severe red flags warning of problems will not go unnoticed. But if individual incentive systems and information-sharing procedures encourage people not to report, even the reddest of red flags can be ignored.
- Security-conscious organizations create rules and procedures to protect valuable assets. But such organizations also have other, often competing, goals: managers are often tempted to instruct employees to bend the security rules to increase productivity, meet a deadline, or avoid inconvenience.
- Prevention of insider threats is a high priority, but leaders and operators should never succumb to the temptation to minimize emergency response and mitigation efforts in order to maintain the illusion that there is nothing to be afraid of.
Insider threat awareness training
Insider threat awareness is a vital component of security awareness. The need for training and education is making news headlines:
- The deadline for Federal contractors to complete insider threat training programs prior to being granted access to classified information under a Department of Defense rule change passed on May 31.
- Harvard Business Review asserts that the best cyber security investment you can make is better training. C-level executives, board directors, shareholders, and other senior leaders must not only invest in training for their firm’s own employees but also consider how to evaluate and inform the outsiders upon whom their businesses rely — contractors, consultants, and vendors in their supply chains. Such third parties with access to company networks have enabled high-profile breaches, including Target and Home Depot, among others.
There is a lot of noise in the cybersecurity space with every company trying to differentiate itself by claiming to be the “next big thing”, but so few have risen to the top. And the security market has changed a lot in the past couple years. As a venture capitalist, I often get asked about how I see the market changing and how we cut through the noise to find and fund companies that are doing something truly unique and innovative and that really solves customer problems.
Sixteen years ago, when we set out to build the first commercial inline Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), the OneSecure IDP, there was a lot of consternation and concern that deploying a solution inline would never happen on enterprise networks. Fast forward to now. We have multiple successful companies like Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet, SourceFire, and others. that have integrated IPS technologies into their NG Firewalls.
Topics: Insider Threats